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CASES NOTED
ADMIRALTY-"BOTH-TO-BLAME" CLAUSE IN OCEAN BILLS
OF LADING
Cross libels by the United States as owner of the S.S. "Nathaniel
Bacon" and the Belgian Overseas Transport, S.A., as owner of M.V. "Esso
Belgium," (wherein the cargo owners were impleaded, or intervened) to
recover respective damages resulting from the collision of the two vessels.
The question framed by the pleadings was the validity of the "Both-to-
Blame" clause' in the bill of lading. Held, reversing the district court, that
said clause was invalid as an argreement limiting the carrier's liability.
United States v. Farr Sugar Corp. et al., 191 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1951).a"
The validity of the Both-to-Blame clause in an ocean bill of lading
has been questioned,2 but a decision squarely meeting the issue is lacking.8
The clause itself is a product of several indigenous American doctrines.
The first of these is the system of divided damages4 as developed by
the United States admiralty courts, as opposed to the theory of apportioned
damages as expressed in the Brussels Collision Convention.5 Thus where
two vessels are at fault in a collision, the one suffering the least damage
pays to the other the amount necessary to make them equal, which amount
is one-half of the difference between the respective losses sustained., It has
been said that equal apportionment is the rule, although one tort-feasor is
1. "If the ship comes into collision with another ship as a result of the negligence
of the other ship and any act, neglect or default of the Master, mariner, pilot or the
servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship, the owners
of the goods carried hereunder will indemnify the carrier against all loss or liability to
the other or non-carrying ship or her owners in so far as such loss or liability represents
loss of, or damage to, or any claim whatsoever of the owners of said goods, paid or
payable by the other or non-carrying ship or her owners to the owners of said goods
and set-off, recouped or recovered by the other or non-carrying ship or her owners as
part of their claim against the carrying ship or carrier . . .," KNAUTH, OCAN BILLS OF
LA.iNc 85 (3d ed. 1947).
Ia. Cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 20 U.S.L.
WEEK 3185 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1952).
2. See KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1.
3. See W.W. Bruce, 94 F.2d 834, 837 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied sub nom.
Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co. v. Weyerhauser Timber Co., 304 U.S. 567 (1938); (... this
renders it unnecessary to consider the much debated legal question as to the validity of
the both-to-blame collision clause.").
4. The Catherine, 17 How. 170 (1854); The North Star, 106 U.S. 17 (1882).
5. The Brussels Collision Convention of 1910, 6 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTn 3-7
(6th ed. 1941); Article 4: "If two or more vessels are in fault the liability of each
vessel shall be in proportion to the degree of the faults respectively committed. . . . The
damages caused either to the vessels, or to their cargoes, or to the effects or other
property of the crews, passengers, or other persons on board, shall be borne by the
vessels in fault in the above proportion without joint and several liability toward third
parties." (Italics supplied.)
6. See note 4 supra.
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guilty of much greater fault, because of the impossibility of correctly ascer-
taining the quantum of fault involved.7 This rule obtains as to actions
between the vessels, but the position of cargo is that of an innocent party
not liable for the consequences of a collision.8 Therefore the shipper has
the election of proceeding in personam at common law or at admiralty
in personam or in rem, as well as an election between joint tort-feasor
where he has been damaged as a result of a collision involving two vessels,
both of which were at fault., "The United States alone ... adheres to
the peculiar doctrine that cargo in ships does not accept the same propor-
tion of fault as its carrier ship in a both-to-blame collision. . .."10
The second is based on the fundamental and jealously guarded prin-
ciple of common law that a common carrier cannot limit its own liability. 1
Any attempt to establish exemptions from liability for the negligence of
the carrier's servants was stricken by the federal courts as wanting in the
element of voluntary consent, and as in conflict with public policy.12 In
order to enable United States shipping to compete favorably for world
markets, Congress enacted the Harter Act.' Its purpose was twofold: (1)
it provided for mitigation of the common law "insurer's" liability of car-
riers, 14 in exchange for, (2) a prohibition of clauses in the contract of
carriage lessening the carrier's liability.15 In effect, the Act relieved the
carrier from liability for the negligence of its servants or agents, if in fact
it did provide a "seaworthy" vessel.' As a result, the shipper lost his right
of action against one joint tort-feasor, the carrier, in a both-to-blame
7. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. See KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 158-159.
11. Liverpool & O.W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 441 (1889).
12. Inman v. South Carolina Ry., 129 U.S. 128 (1889); accord, The Kensington,
183 U.S. 263 (1920); cf. The Folmina, 212 U.S. 354 (1909); see The Delaware,
161 U.S. 459, 461 (1895). (The rule against limitation by contract of the carrier's
liability for negligence had been abrogated in England, as shown by this excerpt
from a petition addressed by the Glasgow Corn Trade Association to the Marquis
of Salisbury and embodied in a report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce of the House of Representatives: "That, taking advantage of this practical
monopoly, the owners of the steamship lines combined to adopt clauses in their bills
of lading, very seriously and unduly limiting their obligations as carriers of the goods,
and refuse to accept consignments for carriage on any other terms than those dictated
by themseves, That this policy has been gradually extended by the steamship owners
until at the present time their bills of 'lading are so unreasonable and unjust in their
terms as to exempt them from almost every conceivable risk and responsibility as carriers
of goods .. ").
13. 27 STAT. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. § 190 (1946).
14. Scarburgh v. Compafiia Sud Americana De Vapores, 174 F.2d 423 (2d Cir.
1949).
15. See L. Hand, J., concurring in American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Mathews,
182 F.2d 322, 325, 326 (2d Cir. 1950).
16. "The Harter Act is intended to relieve the shipowner who has done all that
he can to send out a well-fitted expedition from liability for damages caused by faults
or errors in the navigation and management of his vessel after his ship has gone away
from his personal observation." See 6 BENEDICT, op. cit, supra note 5, at 290.
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collision. This left him to pursue his remedy against the other tort-feasor,
the non-carrier.
In The Chattahoochee,1 7 the Supreme Court held that any payment
by the non-carrier to the shipper for damages resulting from a both-to-
blame collision could be included in computing the total damages suffered
by the non-carrier, and recouped from the carrier when a balance was
struck between the vessels. Thus it may readily be seen that the carrier
may be forced to contribute by this indirect proceeding although exempt
from direct action brought by the shipper.18 Also, it follows that where the
carrier is wholly to blame it is completely exempt from liability, but where
it is only partially to blame it may incur a loss in spite of the provisions
of the Harter Act.'9 To correct this anomalous situation carriers have uni-
formly included the Both-to-Blame clause in the bill of lading, providing
for the indemnification of the carrier by the shipper for all losses sustained
by the former in the recoupment or set-of f, proceedings between the vessels.
20
The district court upheld the clause as a means of evading the pro-
cedural difficulties which operate as barriers to the effectuating of public
policy as changed and declared by the Harter Act.21 In reaching this con-
clusion Judge Medina relied upon the decision in The Jason,22 which gave
rise to the so-called Jason Clause,2 a standard clause in all ocean bills of
lading. The circuit court reversed on the ground that the clause was in
violation of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.2 ' Judge Clark, speaking
for a divided court, maintained that the Jason Clause creates a right in
cargo as opposed to the contention that it is a valid contractual limitation
of the carrier's liability.
It is submitted that an enactment of the legislature is an incontro-
17. 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
18. The admiralty rule as to contribution between tort-feasors is an exception
to the common law rule. However, the right to include damages paid to cargo in the
division does not stand on subrogation, but arises from the tort. The Ceorge W. Roby,
111 Fed. 601 (6th Cir. 1901); Erie R.R. v. Eric & West. Transp. Co., 204 U.S. 220
(1907); Aktieselskabet Cuzco v. The Sucarseco, 294 U.S. 394 (1935).
19. See note 13 suPra.
20. See note 1 supra.
21. United States v. The Esso Belgium, 90 F. Supp. 836, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
22. 225 U.S. 32 (1912).
23. "In the event of accident, danger, damage, or disaster, befor or after com-
mencement of the voyage resulting from any cause whatsoever, whether due to negligence
or not, for which, or for the consequence of which, the carrier is not responsible, by
statute, contract, or otherwise, the goods, shippers, consignees, or owners of the goods
shall contribute with the carrier in general average to the payment of any sacrifices,
losses, or expenses of a general average nature that may be made or incurred, and shall
pay salvage and special charges incurred in respect of the goods.... .KNAUTIS op. cit.
supra note 1, at 86.
24. 49 STAT. 1208 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1946); a restatement of the
Harter Act, and now controlling. Section 1303(8) states, "Any clause, covenant, or
agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship from liability for
loss or damage to or in connection with the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or
failure in the duties and obligations provided in this section, or lessening such liability
otherPise than as provided in this chapter or section 25 of Title 49, shall be null and
void and of no effect .. " (Italics supplied.)
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vertible statement of public policy.-5 Although a particular act may be
the result of "pressurized" legislation, designed to change established
theories of liability, it should not be so strictly construed as to result in a
partial defeat of over-all legislative intent. This anomalous situation created
by legislative omission can readily be corrected, not only by legislating, but
also by a judicial finding that the clause in question is a contractual
limitation that has been provided for in the act.
ADMIRALTY-RIGHT OF CREW UNDER "LAY PLAN" TO
RECOVER FOR NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WITH
ADVANTAGEOUS ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Libelants were engaged in fishing under a lay plan' as the crew of the
Bear. Respondents' boat, the Marsha Ann, collided with and damaged the
Bear, necessitating the Bear's return to port and compelling her crew to
abandon their fishing venture. The crew libeled the respondents for dam-
ages based upon their expectant share of profits under the lay plan. Held,
the Marsha Ann negligently damaged the Bear, for which her owners were
awarded damages;2 but the crew sustained only damnun absque injuria.
Borcich v. Ancich, 191 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 72 Sup. Ct.
293 (1952).3
Collision cases involving the rights of seamen under a lay plan have
been rare. It has been held that such seamen may join with their boat
owners against an intentional- tort-feasor.4 Also, where the fish were al-
ready caught when the collision occurred recovery was allowed the crew
against the negligent boat's owner." In addition, where the owner of a neg-
ligent vessel was also the employer of the crew of the damaged boat, the
members of the crew, though under the lay plan, were allowed to sue in
their own names for the loss of prospective profits." However, the courts
are divided as to whether a crew on the lay plan may join with the owner
25. The Irrawaddy, 171 U.S. 187 (1897); The Jason, sutira note 22.
1. The lay plan is an agreement whereby seamen receive as their compensation a
certain share or profit of the proceeds of the voyage (usually fish). In the instant case
the crew's collective lay was 68%; whereas the owners' share was 32%. However, the
courts are divided as to what kind of interest a crew's lay share represents. Some cases
have followed the rule adopted by Lord Avanley in Wilkinson v. Frasier, 4 Esp. 182, 170
Eng. Rep. 684 (1802) and regard the shares under the lay plan as wages. See United
States v. Laflin, 24 F.2d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 1928); Reed v. Hussey, 20 Fed. Cas. No.
11,646, at 444 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1836); Lewis v. Chadbourne, 54 Me. 484, 485 (1865).
Some decisions apparently regard the crew's interest under the lay plan as a tenancy in
common The Columbia 6 Fed. Gas. 173, No. 3,035 (E.D.N.Y. 1877); The Mary
Steele, 16 Fed. Cas. 1003, No. 9,226 (D. Mass. 1873).
2. The court awarded damages of $4,320 as the owners' 32% interest in the prospec-
tive catch and $17,770.67 as a reasonable amount for the cost of repairs.
3. Mr. Justice Black took the unusual position that not only should certiorari be
granted, but that the judgment should be reversed.
4. United States v. Laflin, 24 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1928).
5. The Mary, 61 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1945).
6. Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. DiLeva, 171 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1948).
